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Simonton: The Power of a State to Control the Export of Hydro-Electric Ener
THE POWER OF A STATE TO CONTROL THE EXPORT
OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC ENERGY
JAMES W. SIMONTONO

Introductwon
During recent years various states have passed more or less
comprehensive water power acts1 designed to provide for the disposal and development of the potential water power of streams,
and to regulate and control the same after development.
In
some of these acts the state expressly declares itself to have full
control of all the potential water power within the state for the
benefit of its people,' and in other acts where the language is not
so specific, it has been assumed that, like wild animals and the
water flowing in the streams, here is something which is the private property of no one, and therefore may be disposed of by the
state for the benefit of the people.' In some acts provisions are
found by which the state seeks to restrict the export of electric
energy derived from hydro-electric developments licensed under
the acts. It is probable that such provisions are void, as violating
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. A discussion of
this question follows.
Wherever there is a stream of water with sufficient fall, the
force of the flow of the current can be converted into electrical
energy which may be transported to distant points and there marketed. Usually the locations where there are considerable quanti* Late Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
The manuscript of
this paper was completed by the author shortly before his last illness. The
editors of the Law Quarterly dre indebted to Mrs. James W. Simonton for
the1 privilege to make this publication of the article.
Statutes exist in Arkansas, California, Maine, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
West Virginia and Wisconsin.
"'All water power in this State suitable for the purpose of producing
power for all lawful purposes, is and the same is hereby declared to be inherent in, and a part of the public domain, and shall vest in and be for
the use of the State of Arkansas, and the people thereof, for its and their
use and benefit." AmK. DiG. STAT. (Supp. 1927), § 10458b.
"In order to conserve and utilize the otherwise wasted energy from the
water powers in this State, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to control the waters of the State and to encourage the utilization of
the power resources in this State to the greatest practicable extent."
VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 3581(1).
""The water power belongs to the State; and the permit provided for
in the act is simply authority to construct dams for the development of
hydraulic or hydro-electric power for sale to the public with necessary transmission lines and auxiliary plants."
Royal Glenn Land & Lumber Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 91 W. Va. 446, 449, 113 S. E. 749 (1922).
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ties of such potential power available are in regions remote from
the places where there are large and desirable markets for electrical energy. Formerly such potential water power was of little
value because of the difficulty in transmitting the energy produced
to places where there was a demand for it.
Improvements in
methods of transmission of electric current have overcome this
difficulty, and, as a result, problems of hydro-electrical development have attained a prominence which threatens to make them an
important national political issue.
The land along the streams is usually privately owned, and
where the so-called common law as to riparian rights prevails,'
the riparian owners have certain natural rights in the flowing
streams which are of vital importance to projects of hydro-electric development. Among other privileges the riparian owner has
a limited privilege of taking water from the stream and also a
right that the upper riparian owners do not take or permit anyone else to take more than a reasonable amount of water from the
stream?
If this latter right be enforced the result is that the
great bulk of the water passes down the stream and eventually
reaches the sea. Subject to this limited but paramount right of
riparian owners to take water, the state has power to control the
taking of water from streams within its borders.
Under this
power the state may prohibit the taking of water not only by
those outside the state' but also by those within its borders,' and
it may permit the taking of water by communities within its borders subject to the rights of riparian owners below the point of
removal," and to some degree subject also to the public right of
navigation. The water in the stream, therefore, is not owned, but
the state in its sovereign capacity has a considerable power of
cohtrol over its removal therefrom.
The force of the flow of the current of a stream at any point
depends on the slope of'the land through which it passes. Ordin' For an excellent discussion of the origin and development of the law as
to riparian rights see Weil, Comparatve Development of the Law of Water
Courses (1918) 6 CAL. L. REv. 245, 342.
5GouLD,

WATEas (3d ed. 1900)

§§

204-209.

OHudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 S. Ct. 529
(1907). See also the opinion of the state court, 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 AtI.
489 (1906).
"New Jersey v. Jersey City, 94 N. J. L. 431, 111 AtI. 544 (1920); Trenton v. New Jersey, 97 N. J. L. 241, 117 AtI. 158 (1922); aff'd. 262 U. S.
1928 (1923).
This right of lower riparian owners to have the flow substantially undiminished is a property right and of course if a city desires water such
property rights may be taken by eminent domain if authorized by statute.
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arily the natural characteristics of the land, including the advantages due to its slope, belong to the owner of the land. While
the state in its sovereign capacity has a considerable power of
control over the taking of water from the stream, it does not follow that it has a like power of control over the privilege of utilization of the force of the flow of the water in the stream, for the
slope of land which produces the power is a natural characteristic
of the land itself and presumably belongs to the land owner.'
It is not the purpose here to discuss this very interesting question. 0 In order to avoid a decision of this question the discussion
below will be based first, on the assumption that the state does
have the power of control of the utilization of the force of the
flow of the current of its streams for the benefit of its people, and
second, on the assumption that the privilege of utilization of the
force of the current is a natural right which is a part of the
riparian land and that the state's power of control is limited to its
power over navigation, fish and the health, safety and welfare of
its people.
I. Assuming the Privilege of Use of the Flow of Streams is not
the Private Property of the Riparian Owner
There seems to have grown up a general belief that the state
has full power of control over the development of all potential
water power resources within its borders, and as stated above, some
states have expressly asserted such power of control in statutes.
While the validity of none of these acts has been tested in the
courts, there is a serious question as to whether they do not violate
the Federal Constitution. One phase of the question only will be
discussed below, namely, to what extent may a state for the benefit
of its citizens control the export of electric current produced from
its hydro-electric plants.
-Three states which have by statute asserted control over the
export of hydro-electric current are Maine, Wisconsin and West
0

That the right to the flow of the stream belongs to the riparian owner
and is property, see GouuD, op. cit. supra n. 5, § 204; FARNiIAu, WATERs
(1904) § 471.
" Under the decisions at present it seems the right of the riparian owner
to use the flow of the stream for power is settled, but there is a general
belief on the part of the public, and even of many lawyers that here is a
resource which belongs to the public. As a matter of fact riparian owners
along streams suitable for large power developments have never made any
considerable use of their alleged right. Perhaps the force of public opinion that this unutilized resource ought to belong to the public may have
weight in changing the law in view of the fact riparian owners do not utilize
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Virginia. Ever since 1909 Maine has had a statute which expressly prohibits owners of hydro-electric plants exporting any
current produced therefrom." An elaborate act passed in 1929
which was designed to permit the export of surplus hydro-electric
current was submitted to a referendum and defeated by a substantial majority. ' In both Wisconsin" and West Virginia" there
are provisions giving a preference to customers within the state
as to electric energy produced by hydro-electric plants, leaving
for export what is not required by such customers, but there are
no special provisions requiring extensions of transmission lines
within the state so as to supply the wants of the inhabitants of
an ever increasing territory within the state.'
Electric energy
is a commodity subject to the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution," so the question is whether the state may control the
this energy. Moreover new legislative policies and purposes may be asserted under which the privileges of the riparian owner may eventually be
restricted. For example, in the Wisconsin statute the enjoyment of scenic
beauty is expressly declared to be a public right and the denial of a permit for a dam is authorized when found to be contrary to such public interest. Wis. STAT. (1929) § 31.06(3). *Whether this is now enforcible may
be open to question yet certainly such an interest is as easily sustained as
statutes prohibiting unsightly billboards.
"ME. REv. STAT. (1916) c. 60, § 1.
-Me. Laws 1929, c. 280.
""Upon complaint by any party affected, setting forth that any grantee
of a permit to develop hydraulic power and generate hydro-electric energy
for sale or service to the public is not furnishing citizens of this state with
adequate service at reasonable rates in consequence of sales of such energy
outside of the state, the commission shall have power to declare any or
all contracts entered into by said grantee for such sales null and void in
so far as they interfere with such service or rate. Such declaration shall be
made only after a hearing and investigation and a recorded finding that
convenience and necessity require the sale of a specified part or all of such
energy within this state." Wis. STAT. (1929) § 31.27. The applicant for
a permit under the act by 31.095(1) must agree to this power of the commission.
""Under all licenses, excepting those of railroad corporations licensed
solely for their own use, the reasonable needs for electric power and energy
on the part of the State and consumers in this State who can reasonably
be served by the licensee shall have preference as compared with the needs
of others, and the commission shall have power to enforce this provision by
appropriate orders." W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9, § 6(f). The
West Virginia Water Power Act of 1929 has recently been held void as
violating the State Constitution in Hodges v. Public Service Commission,
110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E. 834 (1931). The last section repealed the Water
Power Act of, 1915 and since the Act of 1929 was held entirely void presumably the Act of 1915 is now in force. The Act of 1915 went further
than a mere preference. By the Act of 1915 the Public Service Commission
was fully empowered to control the export of hydro-electrie energy even to
the extent of forbidding export. See W. Va. Acts of 1915, c. 17, § 15.
"It may be possible under the laws relating to utilities in general to compel extension of transmission lines.
IIPublic Utilities Commission v. Attleboro, etc., Co., 273 U. S.83, 47 S. Ct.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss1/3

4

8

EXPORT
OF of
HYDRO-ELECTRIC
Simonton:
The Power
a State to Control the ENERGY
Export of Hydro-Electric Ener

export of such energy produced from water power within the
state.
If we assume the force of the flow of the current in the
streams within a state is the property of no one, and therefore is
within the control of the state for the benefit of its people, then
it would seem that the state may regulate the development of
hydro-electric plants and as a condition to permission to make
a hydro-electric development may prohibit or control the export
of any of the electric energy derived therefrom. If so, the Maine
act is valid for it is plainly designed to preserve all the hydroelectric energy for the use of the people of that state. It would
seem to follow that if Maine may prohibit such export, then West
Virginia and Wisconsin may impose a lesser condition on such
hydro-electric development, namely, that only that hydro-electric
energy not required by customers within the state be available
for export, or to put it another way, that customers within the
state have a preference as to the use of such current. The above
conclusions are supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court
as to the state's power over wild animals and its power of control
of the taking of water from the streams within the state.
In Geer v. Connecticut" a statute permitting the taking of
game birds within Connecticut and their sale within the state only,
but prohibiting export was sustained, such game birds being considered not to be a commodity within the protection of the commerce clause. The theory of this decision is that wild animals
are the property of no one and are therefore under the control
of the state for the benefit of its citizens and therefore the state
may reserve all such animals for the use of its people. Furthermore, water flowing in streams is not private property, so as to
such water it has been held the state may prohibit exportation
beyond the boundaries, 8 and may even fix the terms and conditions upon which municipalities within the state may take water
from. the streams." True, in Foster-Fountain Packing Company
v. Haydelr a Louisiana statute requiring all shrimps caught in
294 (1927). For want of a better term the writer has called electric energy
a commodity in the discussion below. At all events, it is property which the
Supreme Court has held may be sold in interstate commerce.
17161 U. S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 600 (1895).
See also New York ex reZ. Silz v.
Hesterberg,
211 U. S. 31, 29 S. Ct. 10 (1908).
18
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra n. 6.
" Trenton v. New Jersey, supra n. 7.
278 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 1 (1928).
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Louisiana waters to be hulled and canned within the state, but
permitting free export of the meat after it was canned was held
void as a restraint on interstate commerce but this was on the
ground that the design of the state statute was to permit and encourage the taking of shrimps and their export in interstate commerce and not to preserve them for the use of the people of the
state. The Act of Maine of 1909 is designed to preserve hydroelectric current for the use of the people of the state and does
not permit exportation. Under the Acts of West Virginia and
Wisconsin the corporation which erects the plant must get a license from the state to do so and one of the conditions imposed
upon the exercise of the privilege is that preference shall be given
to consumers within the state as to the use of the electric energy
produced. If the state can entirely prohibit the export of hydroelectric current then it may grant the privilege of hydro-electric
development to a corporation on condition that it agrees to such
preference. While water power acts such as those of West Virginia and Wisconsin are intended to encourage the development
of hydro-electric power, they do not fall within the doctrine of
Foster-Fountain Packing Company v. Haydel because they do
provide that intrastate customers are to have the use of the energy if they so desire and if they should utilize all of the production of any hydro-electric plant none would be available for
export. Therefore, it is submitted that if the force of the flow
of the current of water in streams within the state is not private
property, then like wild animals and water within the stream,
this resource is within the control of the state for public benefit,
and that the state may constitutionally prohibit the export of
hydro-electric current produced from such streams. It may also
impose any lesser condition on the grant of the privilege of development such as the requirement that the consumers of the state
have a preference, or that the licensee pay a special fee or tax on
all such current exported.'
II.

Assuming the Privilege of Use of the Flow of Streams is
Private Property

Assuming that the privilege of utilization of the force of the
flow of the current of a stream for the production of power is a
Under the Maine Act of 1929 a special charge of four percent. of the
proceeds was imposed upon'all current exported. See Me. Laws 1929, c. 280, §
4. This act was to take effect only if approved at a referendum of the
people. It was defeated.
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natural right attached to the riparian land, and therefore the
private property of the owner or owners of such land, may the
state prohibit a riparian owner from erecting dams and hydroelectric plants except on condition that the electric current produced be utilized within the state; or may a state impose a condition upon its consent to the erection of such a plant, such as a
requirement that the wants of domestic consumers be supplied
first, and only the surplus be subject to export; or a condition
such as a requirement that a special tax be paid upon all of the
current from such plant which is exported? Clearly the state
has certain regulatory powers over the erection and operation of
such plants under its police powers, and under its power of control over fish and navigation, but assuming there is no objection
to a proposed plant upon any such grounds, may the state nevertheless permit the erection of a proposed hydro-electric plant only
upon some condition such as suggested above?
The private owner of riparian land suitable for hydro-electric
development not having the privilege of the power of eminent
domain, could not market his product in other states unless an
existing utility had transmission lines crossing his land which
lines extended into other states, or unless his land either adjoined,
or extended into another state. But he might have access to some
such facility for selling his product as a commodity to enter into
interstate commerce.' It has been held that electric energy is a
commodity or product which may be under the protection of the
commerce clause,' and certainly no distinction can be made between that derived from the use of fuels such as coal or gas, and
that produced from water power. If the privilege of using the
power of the stream belongs to the landowner then all he does is
to convert the energy of the current into another form of energy.
This new form of energy is marketable in interstate commerce,
and is as much under the protection of the commerce clause of
the Federal Constitution as is oil or gas or any other natural
product of the soil, and also, it would seem, as is any agricultural
product.
The interpretation of the commerce clause as applicable to
the situation under discussion must be'determined from the de'It is also possible that a public utility might exercise the power of
eminent domain in order to acquire a transmission line which would reach
the riparian owner's land and over which the electric energy could pass.
'ePublic Utilities Commission v. Attleboro, etc., Co., supra n. 16; Coal &
Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 662, 670, 100 S. El. 557
(1919).
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cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and while
cases involving the validity of state statutes designed to keep certain products of other states out of the particular state are numerous, decisions involving state statutes designed to keep within
the state some product of the state, or to restrict in some manner
the export of such product are not common. No attempt will be
made to collect and discuss exhaustively all of such cases but
those which seem pertinent will be noted.
A state statute requiring purchasers of wheat within the state
of North Dakota to separate the dockage and to return it to the
seller unless such dockage be valued and paid for, was held void
as an unwarranted burden on interstate commerce, though the
statute in question applied to wheat purchased both for sale within the state and for shipment in interstate commerce, and though
no interstate shipment had begun or was necessarily within the
intention of the purchaser."' Cases furnishing still closer analogies are those which involve state statutes designed either to prevent the export of natural gas produced with the state, or else
designed to give to consumers of natural gas within the state the
preference as to its use and permitting export only of the surplus
over and above that required to supply such consumers. In West,
Attorney General of Oklaloma v. Kansas Natural Gas Company,'
there was involved an Oklahoma statute designed to prevent the
export of any natural gas produced within the state. This act
the majority of the court held void as an unwarranted burden
upoil interstate commerce, though three justices dissented without
filing opinions or in any manner indicating their reasons.
In
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,' there was involved a statute providing in effect that the wants of intrastate consumers of natural
gas produced within the state should be adequately supplied with
this product, leaving available for export the surplus over and
above what such consumers might require. The court following
the Oklahoma case held this statute also void as imposing an improper burden upon interstate commerce.' Again three justices
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 45 S. Ct. 481 (1925).
221 U. S. 229, 31 S. Ct. 564 (1910).
-262 U. S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658 (1923).
7It has been urged by Professor T. P. Hardman that this act should be
upheld on the ground that it is the common law duty of a utility to render
adequate service and that this statute merely requires utilities in the state
to supply to their customers an adequate amount of gas and therefore there
is no unlawful restriction on interstate commerce. See The Right of a State
to Brestrain the Exportation of Its Natural Besources (1920) 26 W, VA. T,
2

q.

224,
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dissented, all of them filing opinions, but only two of these dissenting justices indicated disagreement with the majority interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. The reasoning of the majority of the court in both of these cases is that
the right of the landowner to take natural gas from his land is
a private property right,' and after he reduces the gas to possession it becomes a saleable commodity, and as such is entitled to
be sold in the national markets, that is, it becomes a commodity
subject to enter into interstate commerce. This seems to mean
that the owner of such gas is, under the commerce clause, entitled
to a national market for his product, and that one who desires to
purchase and export such gas is guaranteed the privilege of so
doing. The state cannot place an unreasonable restriction on such
privilege. In the Oklahoma case the majority opinion states:
"It (the statute) does not alone regulate the right of
the reduction to possession of gas, but when the right is exercised, when the gas becomes property, takes from it the
attributes of property, the right to dispose of it; indeed selects its market to reserve it for future purchasers and use
within the state on the ground that the welfare of the State
will thereby be subserved . . . . Gas, when reduced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to the owner of the land, and
when reduced to possession, is his individual property, sub-.
ject to sale by him, and may be a subject of intrastate and
interstate commerce. The statute of Oklahoma recognizes it
to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prohibit
it from being a subject of interstate commerce, ....
In such
commerce, instead of the States, a new power appears and
a new welfare, which transcends that of any state. But rather
let us say it is constituted of the welfare of all of the states
and that of each state is made the greater by a division of
its resources, natural and created, with every other State, and
those of every other State with it. This was the purpose,
as it is the result, of the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States."
This language certainly indicates that where one produces
a commodity within a state, he is entitled under the commerce
I This is the decision of the court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S.
190, 20 S. Ct. 576 (1899). The Court of Appeals of West Vriginia has
asserted with vigor that the landowner owns the oil and gas under his laud
just as he owns coal or other solid minerals. Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va.
826, 27 S. E. 781 (1897); Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236
(1905). But this remarkable view as to the landowner's interest in oil and
gas beneath his land would only strengthen the decision of the Supreme
Court in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra n. 25,
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clause to the benefit of selling it in interstate commerce if he
chooses, or in other words, that the state cannot take from him
his right to offer it in the national markets, and cannot require
that he sell it within the state to such intrastate purchasers as
he may be able to find. It may be noted this also may be said
to be the effect of the decisions on the North Dakota statute as
to wheat. The right of the wheat grower to sell in the national
market is protected by the commerce clause.'
Mr. Justice
Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the West Virginia case, with
which Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred, takes the ground that "the
products of a state until they are actually started to a point outside it may be regulated by the State notwithstanding the commerce clause". He also stated that he thought the decision in
the Oklahoma case wrong, "implying that Pennsylvania might
not keep its coal, or the northwest its timber, etc. But I confess
I do not see what is to hinder ....
that the Constitution does not
prohibit a State from securing a reasonable preference for its
own inhabitants in the enjoyment of its products even when the
effect of its law is to keep the property within its boundaries
that otherwise would have passed outside.' '' Here is a clear conflict as to policy in the interpretation of the commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Holmes would restrict its application to cases where
the product has actually started upon its interstate journey, while
the majority of the court seem committed to extending protection
to all privately owned property within the state which may become a proper subject of commerce between the states. Certainly as a matter of national policy state restrictions upon free exchange of commodities seems undesirable, and perhaps the commerce clause as applied by the majority is the best method of
' This generalization expresses the opinion of the writer as to the meaning of the majority of the court. If this is correct then a distinction can
be clearly made between cases where a person has' private property he desires to sell in interstate markets and cases involving wild animals or water
in a stream which is not privately owned for as to these things the state may
control the disposition as it pleases.
262 U. S. 533, 600, 602-603, 43 S. Ct. 658, 666, 667. Holmes denies that
any "speculative view" of title has anything to do with the matter but
seemingly insists a state may give a preference to its inhabitants as to any
of its natural products or natural advantages in so far as the commerce
clause is concerned. It seems that aside from his own language in this case
and in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, supra n. 6, there is nothing in the
decisions of the Supreme Court to sustain this notion, but that the majority
of that court have made a distinction based on the difference between
things privately owned and things not privately owned,
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preventing undesirable state restrictive laws. Coming now to our
inquiry as to whether a state can prohibit the export of hydroelectric energy produced within the state we may say if the majority opinion in the above cases represents the law, then such a
restriction of the export of hydro-electric current produced within the state is also void. Furthermore, if West Virginia cannot
legally provide that her own citizens are to be adequately supplied with such natural gas produced within the state as they may
require, then it follows that neither West Virginia nor Wisconsin
can lawfully require that a hydro-electric utility within the state
supply adequately the customers within the state and export only
such surplus as may remain. Under the above decisions as to
natural gas this would be an unwarranted restriction on interstate commerce, unless there is some distinction between natural
gas and hydro-electric energy. It is submitted that if the riparian
owner owns the privilege of utilizing the energy of the current
then he may convert such energy into marketable form and when
so converted he is entitled to sell that energy in interstate commerce.
As a matter of national policy state restrictions upon the
free exchange of commodities seem undesirable. If the right of
the citizen to sell in national markets is not protected then the
state may lessen or even destroy the value of his property by limiting him to such purchasers as he may be able to find within the
state. ' It is submitted that the use of the commerce clause is a
good and efficient method to accomplish this result.
Perhaps
it is the best and simplest method. But if only a good and efficient method it is justifiable.
It seems clear from the above lines of cases that the distinction
between wild animals and flowing water on the one hand, and
wheat, natural gas and hydro-electric energy on the other turns
upon the fact that the latter are privately owned while the former
are not. The commerce clause applies to the privately owned
commodities.
It has been argued that while a state cannot forbid the ex'It is to be noted that if Oklahoma could have prohibited the export of
natural gas the market of private owners would have been so limited that
this commodity for very many years would have been almost worthless. Experience since the decision of West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra n. 25,
has been such as to show that that statute, if sustained, would have made
gas almost worthless and would have greatly increaspd the wasto of this
valuable commodity.
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port of natural gas under the commerce clause, it may deny to
corporations wishing to engage in such export business the use
of the power of eminent domain in order to secure rights of way
for pipe lines which are essential to the exportation of such natural gas. Clearly the same argument can be made as to hydroelectric current for transmission lines are essential to marketing
this energy. In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Company' the point
arose and was decided. It was urged the state might deny its
power of eminent domain and thus prevent the export of natural
gas. True there were existing pipe lines through which gas was
being exported and since the effect of the statute, if valid, would
be to destroy these, a difficulty existed. But the Supreme Court
held that since natural gas was a legitimate article which could
be placed in interstate commerce "no state by the exercise of,
or by the refusal to exercise, any or all of its powers, may substantially discriminate against or directly regulate interstate commerce or the right to carry it on.' "' It followed that the right of
eminent domain being freely given to intrastate utilities transporting natural gas, could not be denied to interstate utilities when
it prevented or unduly restricted interstate commerce in that commodity. This would clearly be a discrimination. At the time the
restrictive statutes as to hydro-electric current were enacted in
West Virginia, Maine and Wisconsin there probably were utilities
with transmission lines in some or all of these states over which
electric energy produced in steam plants was being exported.
But whether there 'were or were not such existing transmission
lines does not seem material, for if we once admit that hydroelectric current is a product which the owner is entitled to sell
in interstate commerce and is under the protection of the commerce clause then a denial of the right of eminent domain, in
order to prevent the construction of interstate transmission lines
would be a discrimination, provided the state in question was
freely giving such power to intrastate utilities.
In conclusion, it is submitted that if the privilege of using the
flow of the current of streams is the private property of the
riparian owners, then the state's power of control of the export
of electric energy produced from such source is limited by the
82Supra n.25.
: 221 U. S. 229, 261, 31 S. Ct. 564, 573, quoting from Haskell v. Cowhau,

187 Fed, 403, 407 (C. C.

A. 8th 1911).
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commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. In spite of a general belief in states which have potential water power, that this
is a resource which the state may dispose of for the benefit of its
people, it is improbable that this will become the settled law in
the face of the long history of opinion to the contrary. If this
proves true then those states which seek to have this resource developed and the product devoted to intrastate uses are doomed to
failure.
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